Book Discussion: Theory of Poker, Chapter 13

Since F. Paul seems to be on an extended leave, i'll take over and make the next ToP thread.

Why is raising with the 2nd best hand a +EV move instead of just calling?


NOTE: Please do not quote the book. This thread is to help broaden the understanding of the book, not rip off the copyright of it. Feel free to discuss, but try doing so without infringing on David Sklansky's and 2+2 Publishing's intellectual property rights. Thank you.

*blushes* Sorry about that. I've been away during Easter, and just as I got back, I caught the mother of all colds and I've been generally feverish.

Good initiative though. I can set-up the thread now if you want, or we can continue here. Should probably rename it so people recognize it (Book Discussion: Theory of Poker, Chapter 13). Maybe need a mod to rename it in case the 30 minute timer has expired.

I dunno. I still have a fever, so chances are my thoughts aren't too coherent. Plus, I need more coffee.

Hmmm...edited title. But it only changed for the post, not the thread. I'll have to monkey around with this later as I have to get ready for work now. Sorry boys. We'll get fixed one way or another.

I fixed it 'cos I'm cool and stuff.

OK I will take a shot. I have not read ToP yet but have read a couple others.

I say it is +EV because if you have the second best hand the only way you can win is to get your opponent to fold.

I am probably way off but thought I would give it a try. By the way I constantly win pots with the second best or maybe even worst hand with well timed raises (such as when a scare card comes up or the board is paired). Ok now someone give the real reason why it is +EV

This idea applies in multi-way pots, because you can possibly go from a 30% winner to a 40-45% winner, which is good. You raise to get out hands that only have a slight chance to win. If you have middle pair with an ace kicker, but if hitting your ace would mean them hitting a gutshot or possibly hitting a flush, you need them out of the hand.

Although you are right that him possibly folding is a +EV move. Making a better hand fold is always a +EV move.
edit: when coupled with the % gained when getting worse hands out, that is.

because you're buying yourself equity, possibly up to %100 (by pushing a lone opponent out of the hand, making him fold)
also like LoDog said, it is more easily done when the turn or river brings a scare card like a 3rd suited card or a 4-to-a-straight etc etc
i remember in SS2 doyle says that on a board like 345 if faced with a big bet, he'll often call with nothing because of the bluffing opportunity that an A,2,6 or 7 would bring. You can take down a pot literally with nothing but K high while you're opponent might have QQ or KK or even trips by making a massive bet when that scare card drops.

Re: Raising to get a free card.

This, in my opinion, is a play that's suited mostly for heads-up pots. If there are three or more people in a pot, raising to get a free card (presumably so that everyone will check to you on the turn, you check, and you get to see the river) is not a good idea, if you're on some kind of a draw that you believe will give you the best hand. Consider the following:

You have an inside straight draw on the flop, plus one overcard:

You: Ks-Js
Flop: Qd-9h-3s

You're on the button, and there are three other players in the pot. The second player bets, third player calls, and the action comes to you. There are 6 small bets in the pot. Let's examine what happens if you call vs. raise.

You call. You're getting 6-1 on your call, which is not quite sufficient on the inside straight, but you could also spike a king, which gives you another three outs (although possibly tainted), and you have a backdoor flush draw. So, with the extra outs and the implied odds, you can almost certainly call profitably. If you (as is likely) miss the turn, you will probably have to pay a big bet to see the river. It's possible that you will have to fold by then, as the pot is only guaranteed to be 4.5 big bets when the action gets to you if the same player bets, and 4.5-1 is not quite enough to call with the outs you have, unless your flush draw becomes live.

You raise. You decide to try for a free card, so you can get a cheap look at the river and see two cards for (almost) the price of one. You now pay two small bets for the chance of seeing the river, instead of 3 small bets if you had called (1 small bet on the flop, 1 big bet = 2 small bets on the turn).

Advantages of raising: A large percentage of the time you will get to see the river for only two small bets instead of three, let's say 80%. Some percentage of the time the original bettor will 3-bet you on the flop, and then lead out on the turn, completely negating your play, perhaps 18%, as some percentage of the time, everyone will fold the flop, the remaining 2% - but this is a freak occurence with a bettor and a caller already in. Averaging this out, you're paying to see the river:

2 small bets 80% of the time
5 small bets 15% of the time (3 on the flop and one big bet on the turn)
2% of the time, you win 6 small bets right there = -0.12.

Costing you 1.6 + 0.75 - 0.12 = 2.23 small bets. Still, this is cheaper by far than calling both on the flop and the turn

Drawbacks of raising: You're only about 25% to win this hand at this point, and you're putting in a raise where you may be three-handed. Clearly you're costing yourself money on this flop. That's not the core of the problem though: You already know that you just barely have the pot odds to continue even with a call, but you're justifying it based on future implied odds. What happens when you raise, however, is that you're killing your implied odds. The person in first position who checked is unlikely to call two bets colds on this flop, so he probably folds. The other two people are now going to check to you on the turn, meaning that if you hit either a king or a straight there, you won't be able to trap them for two bets. You hit your monster, they check to you, you bet, they fold. B'bye implied odds. Now there are unfortunately so many different scenarios that putting numbers on them becomes too much of a chore for a Sunday morning, but I'm willing to argue this if anyone feels that my reasoning is off.

In conclusion: Raising for a free card, in my opinion, is best done when there are other, auxilliary, benefits. Most of these come in play when it's a heads-up pot:

• Your raise may buy a free card.
• Your raise may fold a better hand (making it a semi-bluff).
• Your raise may help define your opponent's hand

Highly important sidenote: In no-limit play everything changes. You can toss in a relatively small raise on the flop, and then check the turn. If the first aggressor would have bet the turn, it's plausible that he would have made a much bigger bet, and one small raise has now gotten you two cards in a key-pot. Your check behind on the turn may also fool him into trying to muscle you out on the river, and if you hit your card then you're up for a jackpot. There are still conditions that need to be met here, of course, but it becomes a much more viable play in big-bet poker. Or, as Tenbob put it, "better to raise once than call twice."

If all those who haven't posted in this thread aren't doing it on account of this chapter being so obvious, you're all smarter than me, by the way. This was the chapter I had by far the hardest time digesting in this book, because a lot of it is counterintuitive.

Like raising with what you believe to be the second best hand. It has already been mentioned in this thread, but who can come up with a situation (preferably a hold 'em situation, and one that is actually plausible) and show how this is actually a good play?

It's not trivial.

Have you found anything in this chapter where you felt "I should really start raising in situation <x> where before I only cold called!" and then adapted it? What kind of situations?

Like raising with what you believe to be the second best hand. It has already been mentioned in this thread, but who can come up with a situation (preferably a hold 'em situation, and one that is actually plausible)?

This situation comes up in a mulit way pot 4 or more players when we have 2nd pair in MP with a better hand before us who we think that has top pair.

show how this is actually a good play?

If we raise or reraise the better hand, we have the possiblity to drive out the other opponets in the hand, there by increasing our odds to win the pot. Also by showing aggression we could win with a bluff on the river.

we have k10spades with 4 people in the hand

flop is a k 6 with 2 hearts. raise to get the draws out that hitting your 10 for 2 pair will give them a straight or possibly a flush. it isnt a big percentage that they will hit their straight, but you need that % as yours to beat the a2 that limped in the hand

Right, but our odds need to increase a whole lot.

No, and this is the problem. In a fourhanded flop, the pot is usually around 8 bets. You're putting in two bets to increase your equity with a couple of percent in a pot that's 8 bets. If the pot is 10 bets and you can gain 10% equity, you break even.

But gaining 10% equity is difficult. Let's look at this example: You have KT on a A-T-4 flop. You think one person has an ace, so you're not best. By raising, however, you're hoping to drive out QJ, who - if your hand hits a K - will improve to a straight. Thereby, you're "buying yourself 3 outs" which is cool. 3 outs with two cards to come is about 10% equity, so if the pot is more than 10 bets, you've made a good move.

Problem: You are not 100% sure that someone actually has QJ. And if you estimate the chance of someone having QJ to be, say, 50% (still an extremely good read would be needed to be this precise) the pot would have to be 20 bets for you to profitably make this move. And now the problems begin: An inside straight would be getting 10-1 on a call if the pot was 20 bets, so they still wouldn't fold.

Here's a good argument. In fact, it's with this play as with raising to get a free card: It's the combination of different advantages that can make it alright. Consider this:

KT on a A-T-4 board. The following are reasons to bet:

1. Your hand could be the best. You can't know that anyone has an ace. It may be likely, but not certain.

2. A raise could drive out hands like QJ and buy you outs. If QJ folds, you have 3 more outs to win.

3. You may be able to get a free card. If you raise and everyone else folds, you may check the turn if you like.

4. You may be able to muscle out a better hand by bluffing later on. Let's say that your hand is the strongest right now, and you raise the guy who bet with JT. On the turn, a Q falls, and suddenly the person who had KQ and was drawing to the straight has a better hand than you. However, he doesn't know that. For all he knows, you have the pair of aces (which you certainly represented) so he may fold on the turn or the river if you bet again, despite having the best hand.

Combined, they make a compelling argument for raising. But reason #2 is very, very rarely strong enough by itself to raise. And when it is, it's usually because the pot is so big that others get the correct odds to call even two bets.

By the way, my post count was 666 before this post, but now it's all ruined.

Combined, they make a compelling argument for raising.

This is true. It seems the key word is combined. To raise for the sake of raising is incorrect. It seems to me that by raising we are getting mutiple things from the raise. That I was aware of, but not nearly as perceptive about after reading this chapter...By raising we get information from the other players in the hand in the form of a call or reraise.

Right. There's a lot more to the idea of being "aggressive" than just table image. Raising is often the right play, because of the many good things that can come from it.

I like this chapter a lot, but like I said, it takes some time to digest.

I have a feeling I will need to read this book several times to get everything down pat.